scientific aspect of folklore, he proposed "to collect and publish in c form, information on all aspects of folk life, using the term in its wides the hope of enabling us to find out how and why changes in customs and come about, and thereby developing a real science of folklore" (1946: In hindsight, this was a disappointing research program. From the s had offered us, ten years earlier, the classic study of The Hero (1936) , in formulated an analytical model for the heroic personality in tradition have expected a more innovative and rigorous agenda, but Raglan couc gument in personal anecdotes and grounded it in the local landscape o lish countryside. His science of folklore was British through and thr researchers were city and country gentlemen and their objects were comm of miners and farmers. The Trobriand Islanders, the Nagas of Assa Ashanti were the symbolic distant other, about whom, paradoxically, mor mation was available than "about our own fellow-countrymen" (194 approach to the science he espoused was, at best, amateurish. He foun topics "interesting" (1946:101, 102) without formulating a theory, a h or a broader frame of knowledge that would offer a reason for his intere Furthermore, the directions for the rejuvenation of the science o might have been new to Raglan, but hardly to anybody else. No doubt been immense progress in his three targeted areas since 1946, but by that stantial research on these subjects had already been made. The historic everyday life had been fermenting in France at least since the establishm Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale (1929) by Marc Bloch (1886 Lucien Febvre (1878 -1956 .' As a systematic field of study, dialectolog the mid-19th century (Chambers and Trudgill 1980; Francis 1983) . In lan's selection of dialect as a new challenge for folklore research is somew fling, since the first book that has the word folk-lore in its title also has dialect in the title (Sternberg 1851) . Finally, the study of vernacular a flourished in continental Europe and England during the interwar 1943[1931] ; Peate 1940) . However, Raglan, not an academic, did not be sponsibility of acknowledging previous scholarship when advancing n In contrast, across the Atlantic, Melville Herskovits surveyed the fields lore from an academic perspective that had been shaped by his anthr education and research experience in Africa and the Americas. Quot Thompson (1940:866) , he first noticed the worldwide acceptance of t European languages, then pointed out that this linguistic diffusion did conceptual uniformity. "In Germany, Volkskunde has from the begi treated as a subject offar wider scope than the folklore ofEngland. . . . In countries, both of Europe and the New World, the concept of the sco lore varies between the limits set by the English and the Germ (Herskovits 1946:92, emphasis in original) . In France, he further rem Gennep had not considered folklore "a simple collection of trivial unrelat which are more or less curious and amusing, but a synthetic science t cerned in particular with rural life and peasants and those of them who l dustrial and urban surroundings" (Herskovits 1946:92-93) .3 Thro Ben-Amos, The Name Is the Thing 259 address Herskovits juggled the American, the German, the French, an lish views in order to achieve his desired redefinition of"folklore" as the oral literature.
Though it was problematic, encumbered by conflicting approaches and contradictory theories and methods, for both Raglan and Herskovits folklore was a science writ large. Raglan projected folklore as a historical science of everyday life that was concerned with behavior, speech, dress, and housing. His words rang fresh within the context of English folklore. By comparison, Herskovits's science of folklore was in the anthropological tradition that Franz Boas had initiated in the United States (Bronner 1986; Stocking 1996) and that William Wells Newell articulated in his programmatic essay (JAF 1888) and other writings (Newell 1898) . Herskovits concluded that in spite of the ambiguities of the term and the dilemmas folklorists faced, "Folklorists ... have succeeded over the century just ending, in welding our discipline firmly into the structure of scientific scholarship" (1946:94) . For him, "what we call folklore... which to many seems trivial, to many seems dull . . . may become the most attractive and serious of sciences " (1946:94) . While Herskovits reached out for textual support for his ideas all the way across the Atlantic, quoting Andrew Lang from A. R. Wright (1931:11) , it was clear that he had in mind the particular American configuration of folklore that Newell delineated around the same time that Andrew Lang did.
No doubt, 50 years ago, the perception that folklore was welded "firmly into the structure of scientific scholarship" was somewhat premature. With no departments to speak of, no research institutes, and no training programs, individuals rather than universities bore the burden of folklore. Their accomplishments and future plans were then and now a source of pride and inspiration. In their studies they spanned the gamut of cultures from regional Americana to German, Spanish, African, and other immigrant lores, to the folklore of the American Indians in the East, the Plains and the West (JAF 1946; Gayton 1947) .
The absence of nationalism as a component of folklore was unique to the American configuration of folklore. Nationalism was crucial in the transformation of the German Volkskunde from avocation to science (Riehl 1859) , and functioned to catalyze folklore scholarship in smaller European nations (Alver 1989; Basgoz 1972; Dow 1991; Gillis 1994; Herzfeld 1982; Hutchinson 1987; Kapferer 1988; Snyder 1959; Wilson 1976 ), but regional diversity and multiple ethnicity have left no space for the popular nationalistic spirit. It did not figure in the American folklore paradigm that William Wells Newell constructed (Abrahams 1988; Bell 1973, n.d.) and on the basis of which Herskovits formulated his redefinition of folklore.
Similarly absent from Herskovits's thesis is the "affable condescension to the common people' " that Wright (1931:9) discerns in Henry Bourne's Antiquities Vulgares (1725), and traces of which are still apparent in Lord Raglan's commemorative address. Such a sentiment is inherent in the attitude of antiquarians who collected popular objects (Elsner and Cardinal 1994; P. Levine 1986; Pomian (Herskovits 1946:94) .4 Rather, he sets out to show that in America "the pre of Indians ... [had a role] in shaping the conceptualization of our discipline, for American folklorists whose primary concerns were far removed from anth pological studies " (1946:94) .
By reaching out to the formative era of folklore in America, Herskovits evok intellectual roots that stretch even further into European intellectual history. I plicit in his redefinition of folklore as oral literature is not only a restatement o anthropological division of labor in nonliterate societies (Bascom 1953; Zum 1988) but also the adoption of a humanistic perspective that seeks to embrac erate and nonliterate peoples on equal terms. Six years after Herskovits's s ment, the Italian folklorist Giuseppe Cocchiara (1981 Cocchiara ( [1952 :13-28) exposed roots folklore had in Renaissance humanism, and the role it played in shaping t human sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 1940s, unbeknown to Western scholars, Mikhail Bakhtin considered the writings of Rabelais as the earliest indications of folkloristic consciousness (Bakhtin 1968:4) .s But none could have stated the position of folklore in the human sciences more clearly than Cocchiara's 18th-century countryman, Giambattista Vico (1688 Vico ( -1744 , who wrote, employing the term mythology,
The first science to be learned should be mythology or the interpretation of fables; for, as we shall see, all the histories of the gentiles have their beginnings in fables, which were the first histories of the gentile nations. By such a method the beginning of sciences as well as of the nations are to be discovered, for they sprang from the nations and from no other sources. [1984(1948):5116 Fifty Years Later: Lamentations for Folklore
In her 1996 AFS presidential address,Jane Beck, taking a cue from a lawyer who said to Shalom Staub, "You need a new word for yourselves," makes the diagnosis that "the term folklore helps to marginalize the discipline." Therefore she suggests that we "consider the possibility [of changing the name of our field] seriously. We should have," she argues, "a term for the discipline so that people will recognize it as the profound study that it is. We have much to offer other fields; why not change the name and at the same time do a little redefining?" (Beck 1997:134) . Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett identifies "folklore" as a liability, proposing to "change our name to enhance our survival " (1996:252) . Following the principle of "truth in advertising," she argues that "it is time to assess where we find ourselves, those trained as folklorists and those who identify themselves as folklorists, and ask what name best describes what we do" (1996:252).
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has a far more drastic agenda than just changing the name folklore. She well understands that a name change is not a minor verbal cosmetic operation, but that it signals the death of a discipline. and departments (Baker 1971 (Baker , 1986 Boggs 1940 Boggs , 1945 Camp 198 1988; Dorson 1950 Dorson , 1961 Dorson , 1965 Dorson , 1972a Dorson , 1972b Hand 1960) (Samuelson 1983) represented a new era for folklore in the United States. A formal educational program that would constitute folklore as an independent discipline required a framework, delineated boundaries, constructed an intellectual pedigree, and defined fundamental theoretical concepts. All these factors bestowed upon folklore a distinct professional identity. But that change from an elusive existence to a clear presence has proven both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the faculty members appropriated portions out of existing fields such as anthropology, literature, history, linguistics, and ethnomusicology, and recombined them into the paradigm of folklore. On the other hand, with no sufficient number of departments in which to place graduating folklorists there was no way to carry this newly lit torch. While folklore has achieved recognition within the academy, with only a few departments in the entire country it has remained a discipline in isolation.
In order to overcome this paradoxical turn of events, Dorson searched for a strategy for folklore, fully aware of the dynamics of university recruitment:
The crux of the matter lies in the departmental structure of American universities. Departments are composed of scholars holding the Ph.D. in a common field, and they recruit new members with the same doctorate. In smaller institutions, the president may hire new members, but he places them in a department of their fellow-Ph.D.s. The problem for the new doctor of folklore, and his sponsors, is to persuade a department composed of doctors in English, or anthropology, or history, or foreign languages, or music, to give him a home. A number of such departments have taken in their token folklorists, but each negotiation represents a struggle; many institutions possess no folklorists, and too often, especially now, if the folklorist moves to a more attractive situation his vacancy is gobbled up by hungry chairmen, former colleagues, or harassed deans to use for a Milton specialist or an urban anthropologist, or it may simply vanish. [1972a:107] Under such circumstances, the placement of a newly minted folklore doctorate in a university faculty became a familiar struggle. When the postwar growth in U.S. higher education came to a standstill, the folklore graduate pressure at the gates of the academy came to naught. The new doctorates in folklore joined the academic proletariat that rose in numbers in other fields as well, and became part of a national intellectual unemployment line consisting of thousands of personal frustration stories.9
The success in getting the proverbial foot in the academic door turned disastrous when this very door was quick to shut firm again. The growth that took place in the 1960s and early 1970s oversupplied the demand that theoretically it should have opened up. Yet facing such an economic dilemma, no one even contemplated scaling down the development offolklore. All the speakers in the panel entitled "The Academic Future of Folklore" (Dorson 1972a ) save one Dorson's position, emphasizing different aspects of his strategy for expan pending on personal experience and orientation. The only uncomfortably voice was that of Robert Byington (Dorson 1972a:1 13-114) , who, co dialogue he had initiated a year earlier (Sweterlitsch 1971) , pointed th ward the exit sign from the university and onward to applied folklore. A Byington's agenda for the future of folklore was still somewhat vag program for an opportunistic defection from the university clearly emer conclusion of his statement:
What I am saying is that whether [the folklorist] teaches one course, directs a program, chairs a department, or works for church or state, the trained folklorist, qua folklorist, is going to find more and more work; he need merely look around for it. And if this sounds like an endorsement of Applied Folklore, I mean it to. I see "pure" and "applied" on a single continuum, not as disparate or antithetical activities. If I appear to emphasize the latter in these concluding comments, it is only because I agree with what Dick Dorson almost but not quite said, viz., that, whether we like it or not, higher education is entering an era of unprecedented accountability to the public at large-meaning, among other things, that those disciplines with demonstrable social value are likely to fare better that those without it. Folklore has a great opportunity here. Let's not blow it.
[quoted in Dorson 1972a:114, emphasis in original] In spite of the strong support for Dorson's academic strategy for folklore, the lone dissenting voice on that panel won the day. There is a direct continuous line of action from the 1971 Middle Atlantic Conference on Folk Culture, held at Point Park College in Pittsburgh and devoted to the theme of "Applied Folklore," to the formation of an AFS committee on "Applied Folklore," to the "Proposal for the Establishment of a Center for Applied Folklore," to the lobbying effort that culminated in the successful legislation of the 1976 American Folklife Preservation Act.10 Burt Feintuch and the participants in the 1985 conference "Folklife and the Public Sector: Assessment and Prognosis" (Feintuch 1988 ) concur in this historical interpretation. I defer to another occasion a discussion of Byington's claim that " 'pure' and 'applied' [folklore are] on a single continuum" (Dorson 1972a:114) and whether the dichotomies between the two are indeed mistaken (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988) .
At this point it is sufficient to note that the AFS has made a deliberate choice: rather than rising to the challenge that folklore has encountered in the universities, establishing itself as the indispensable discipline that it is, it has sought an alternative model for development outside the academic structure. Serious scholars have assumed that since the academic route is closed it might be possible to open up a new course of action. They found a precedent for such an action during the period of the Great Depression, when the federal government included folklore among the projects designed for the employment of writers, teachers, and local historians (Botkin 1939; Hirsch 1987 Hirsch , 1988 Hirsch , 1996 Mangione 1972:265-285; Penkower 1977:136-158 In the opinion of folklorists who followed that route, being a conscious and conscientious public folklorist depends less upon employment venue than the primacy of collaboration with traditional artists and communities in the representation of their cultural expression. Public folklorists do many or all of the following over the arc ofa career: research and writing to describe and interpret folk cultures; teaching students to know, respect, and further research diverse cultural expression;
producing media documents and curating exhibits and festivals that present traditional communities and the issues they face; addressing public policy and market conditions that affect access to tangible and intangible resources necessary for sustenance of traditional culture; and working with native scholars to assist groups in documenting their own cultures. [Baron and Spitzer 1992:2] While "Public Folklore" indeed has expanded the employment opportunities for the professional folklorists who have made it their choice, there has been one thing that they have encountered in the public arena for which they have not bargained:folklore in scholarship andfolklore in the community have divergent meanings.
As a discipline, folklore has not incurred negative evaluations. Its difficulty in making headway within the academic structure may have to do with its nonscholarly tradition, but not because it "suggests falsity, wrongness, fantasy and distortion" (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996:246). Archer Taylor has observed that
In the humanities folklore has won for itself only a small place. This is not surprising because it has not been able to free itself completely from the antiquarian and dilettante tradition of collecting curiosities. Proverbs, tales, ballads, customs, or superstitions are thought to be quaint and are recorded and studied for that reason. [1952:591 If, then, folklore is tainted it is necessary to distinguish between its various hues.
During the "Mid-century International Folklore Conference" that was held at Bloomington, Indiana in 1953, the negative connotation of the term folklore was not an issue (Thompson 1953:248-265; 318-323) ; neither was it a concern in the flurry of folklore definitions that burst out in the 1950s and early 1960s (Bascom 1953 (Bascom , 1955 Bayard 1953; Halpert 1958; Utley 1961 ).
The first inkling of any negative connotation associated with folklore in a scholarly context appeared in "The Ditchley Park Conference Resolution." In their address to the nonacademic public, the participants acknowledged that "folklore is often regarded as a matter of fun and frivolity" (Dorson et al. 1970:95) . At that time Dorson had not yet recovered, ifhe ever did, from the cutting of one million dollars from the National Defense Education Act that was targeted, among other fields, for folklore. While in his original letter he cited the journalistic ridicule of folklore, he associated the word mainly with folk singers and his pat archenemies, the "fakelorists." "Unhappily," he writes, "the study of folklore in the United States has become contaminated by amateurs, entertainers, and charlatans the word 'folklore' is used so widely, all kinds of people passjudgment on ..." (Dorson 1962:163) . In analytical discourse terms have a life of their own. Folklore has been and redefined many times over. Each country and each generation has mo concept to suit its own intellectual concerns. Scholarly dialogues provide s room for disagreements, nuances, and shifts in meanings, emphases, and within a continuous discourse. The folklore of"New Perspectives" (P In scholarship, the meaning offolklore is subject to negotiati munity at large politicians and the public seek a definite u the question, "What is folklore?" Once folklorists step into fall into the trap of intellectual closure, and by doing so term quiry.
The semantic shifts offolklore that dictionaries document represent an extension of meanings from the particular to the general. As tall tales, legends, folktales, superstitions, and ballads represent lies, fiction, fantasy, and irrationality, so does the general category to which they belong. When folklore extends its social base and becomes a widely circulated term, it broadens its meaning to include connotations that might be in conflict with its learned sense.Jane Beck is a folklore scholar and a proud public folklorist; Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett is academically based but has formulated the theoretical foundation for the public excursion of folklore (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988) . If Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1996) is correct in her description offolklore, the meaning of the term outside scholarly discourse is in itself a survival of 19th-century theories of culture and folklore, a learned idea that has become a gesunkenes Kulturgut in the public domain. There it preserves meanings that scholars held previously but no longer hold. Yet despite her awareness that "the notion of folklore as error" is an error in itself and only part of "popular understanding" (1996:252), she is ready to give up her hard-gained insights for an idea that she knows is wrong. She no doubt knows that folklore has not been "the science of tradition" she claims it to be (1996:252), at least not for the last 50 years, ever since Herskovits pointed out that "the nonsense tales about psychiatrists that go the rounds of University faculty clubs are 'lore' and the intellectuals who tell them are a 'folk' " (Herskovits 1946:100) , and she knows that the concepts of "folk" and "tradition" have been critically examined over and over (Ben-Amos 1984; Dundes 1977; Glassie 1995; Handler and Linnekin 1984; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; McDonald 1997; Shils 1981; Simpson 1921) ; in folkloristics (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1988) these concepts hardly have the same meanings she imputes to them, drawing upon notions prevailing in the general public.
Even some publications for lay readership have taken notice of these conceptual changes. For example, Merriam Webster's Encyclopedia of Literature clearly states, After World War II the study of folklore lost its restrictions of class and even of educational level;
any group that expressed its inner cohesion by maintaining shared traditions qualified as a "folk,"
whether the linking factor was occupation, language, place of residence, age, religion, or ethnic origin. Emphasis also shifted from the past to the present, from the search of origins to the investigation of present meaning and function. [1995:424] The entry, by the way, does not include a single negative word about folklore, neither as a discipline nor as a subject matter.12 Nowadays it is the professional folklorists who lag behind their own image.
The excursion into public folklore has brought on a mental fatigue to the surface personal and professional doubts: "Maybe in fighting name, we'll lose our life as a field of study. Shall we uphold the name, de we do in terms ofit, and correct misconceptions ofwhat folklore is and w lorists do?" (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996:252). Within the discipline t not have been any other reply than a resounding positive affirmation tive reply that Beck, Bendix, and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett so loudly voice i consequence of their exchanging scholarly for popular presentations
They have adopted the perception of the field as it exists in popular they understandably do not like it, but instead of changing their orienta opt to shift the terminological framework of their ideas to suit their ne of operation.
Within the public arena, folklore festivals have replaced the country shows that exhibited freaks of nature. Now the festivals put on display the oddities of modern societies, the storyteller, the craftsperson, and the musician. Such festivals and public presentations do indeed marginalize folklore, making it a quaint curiosity.
The association of such public displays with scholarship, now that trained scholars put them on, makes folklore appear like a freak discipline itself. (1646), one of the books that the canonical history of the field regards as a precursor of folklore research (Dorson 1968:23) .
The name of the discipline is like a site in the archaeolog mulating a science into a layered progression of ideas that are positive or negative ways. A name frames evolutionary as cycles within a discipline, providing it with an identity a 1962). Pre-Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics differ other, but they are physics just the same. Any new theor would be meaningless, unless it were conceived in relation the same discipline. The interdisciplinary forays in which engaged have changed directions and fields in different histor ferent countries, yet even these deliberate digressions from folklore become significant only when they stand in relation pline. Then they can expand its scope or narrow its focus, shi and turn folklore theories upside down, but all these creat cognitive structure provided by the name of the discipline.
There are no free names in a language. Each word, even i folk-lore was 150 years ago, comes with its semantic load. Sear of identity, we would be like orphans scrounging to adopt find out that they have their own troublesome genealogie relationships that we would have no choice but to inherit.
Thoms's new term it is necessary not only to relate it to the place, as Dorson did (1968:1-43) , but also to examine the c and lore had in the English of 1846.
As Schulze (1949) Have I collected language to unfold Truth to my countrymen [Ingpen and Peck 1927:1, 301] In his poem "The Lady of the Lake" (1809-1810), Walter Scott (1771-1 refers to "Tine-man forged by fairy lore" (Scott 1900:167) . Other compou "ancient lore," "philosophic lore," "poetic lore," and "literarian lore," occur the writings of these and other romantic poets (Schulze 1949:17-39) .
In 1830, 16 years before Thoms's coinage, the June issue of the Gentlema Magazine included an essay with the suggestion to use lore instead of the clas suffix -ology, for example, "earthlore" for geology, "starlore" for astrology "birdlore" for ornithology (Schulze 1949:10) . It is impossible to determ whether Thoms was aware of, or remembered, this suggestion, but if he did,folk lore would have meant for him not only the subject matter of the lore of the p ple, but also the study of the people, representing the same duality that troubled folklorists ever since.
William Thoms, antiquarian that he was, did not articulate a theory or a method to accompany his neologism; it was only later generations that shaped and reshaped its conceptual content (Legros 1962) . To a certain extent, the lack of a precise dogmatic definition that students often bemoan served the discipline well, as it enabled folklorists to mold the discipline anew, formulating syntheses of new ideas and maneuvering its directions among the other fields of scholarship.
In the course of time there have been communities of scholars that have used the name of folklore to support some of the most horrendous acts human beings have ever committed. The use of the idea of folklore as conceptualized in the German Volkskunde to support Nazi ideology (Bendix this issue; Dow and Lixfeld 1986 Kamenetsky 1972; Lixfeld 1994; Stein 1987 ) remains a blot on the history of folklore scholarship. But we cannot and should not whitewash it by changing our name. We should not revise our history nor change our name to suit our ideals. Nazi ideology is not "inscribed in the field of folklore" (Bendix this issue:238), nor is any other nationalistic ideology. The Nazis used the idea of folklore often by distorting facts to suit their purposes as they twisted and turned other ideas that have their roots in European Enlightenment and Romanticism, putting them into the service of their ideology and actions (see Olender 1992) .
Nationalism is an attribute that is projected onto, or imagined in, but not inherent to folklore (Anderson 1991; Ben-Amos 1983) . While it is possible to understand the motivation of our German colleagues to distance themselves from the term Volkskunde, abused in the Nazi regime, it is not the name but the actions scholars committed at that time that is abhorrent. By retaining the name folklore we would not be identifying with evil, but maintaining the memory ofthe potentially destructive power of our ideas while employing them constructively in our research.
Folklore among the Disciplines
The evaluation of folklore as a discipline depends on the quality of our scholarship, not our name. There is no need to use folklore as a scapegoat and assume that by doing so we shall achieve the prosperity that has eluded us so far. Realistically, the present state of higher education in the United States does not hold any promise for growth, whatever strategy we shall follow. The creative operations of professional folklorists in regional or ethnic communities do not contribute to the academic strengthening of folklore. Leaving the academy may be a personal choice for individual professional folklorists, but when the discipline as a community heads for the exit gates, it cannot expect to make any further headway within the learning environment from which it defects.
Obviously, it would be an understatement to suggest that there is room for improvement in the position of folklore in the academy. Even outside the structure of disciplinary-bound departments, in the broader domain of intellectual dialogue we all would have liked folklore to fare better. If citations represent an index for the position of a field in the hierarchy of disciplines, even when size is factored into the calculation, folklore hardly has a respectable notch.13 Our record of recognition is spotty. For any evidence of notice it is possible to mount ten indicating neglect. The journal of biblical studies, Semeia, founded in 1974, is the only nonfolklorejournal, to the best ofmy knowledge, that cites folklore specifically as a field upon which its editors want to draw. In their advertisement they announce, Semeia is an experimental journal devoted to the exploration of new and emergent areas and methods in biblical criticism. Studies employing the methods, models, and findings of linguistics, folklore studies, contemporary literary criticism, structuralism, social anthropolo such disciplines and approaches, are invited. [Semeia 1974:2; see Wilder 1974:3] Some current anthropologists point out that "thanks to careful work of and numerous folklorists, we have collections ofthe verbal art ofchildre rope and 'counting out' rhymes, hand-clap songs, jokes, riddles and their games" (Goodwin 1997:4) . Similarly, Susan Seizer acknowledge ership of folklore in some particular areas of social analysis as she notes past two decades-anthropologists have joined linguists and folklorist cantly extending the study of speech acts and their contexts under t verbal performance" (Seizer 1997:62 Africa (1970) . In the decade during formance theory in folklore was brewing, she comments in a note, Of all the relations a speaker may have to someone else's words, perhaps the most int his performing of them, as when an actor recites the lines of a play or when we read aloud or to ourselves. Performing is quite distinct from either quoting, depicting, or r utterance-or, of course, saying it. The relation is, however, a complex matter in [1978:208] During the 1970s there was already a substantial folkloristic literature on the subject, but Herrnstein Smith did not find it meaningful and left folklore on the margin of theory. So did Mary Louise Pratt. In retrospect, her book Toward a Speech Act Theory ofLiterary Discourse (1977) reads like a period piece of the 1970s. It deals with literary texts but skirts the boundaries of face-to-face communication. She draws upon significant linguistic studies on narrative, but finds no use for any of the folkloristic research and theoretical formulation of that decade.
Fortunately, it is possible to notice the winds of change, and the term folklore does not necessarily obscure important scholarship and its appreciation. We can obviously point to some of our own members like Susan Stewart (1991) , who has joined the ranks of major literary theoreticians and incorporates folklore theory and subjects in her work as a matter of course. In addition, we can also identify literary scholars with no previous folklore connections who turn to folklore scholarship without hesitation, finding it relevant to their own concerns. Casual reading that has not been motivated by the anxiety of recognition has turned up essays by Nancy Armstrong (1992) and Harriet Goldberg (1984 Goldberg ( , 1993 . A deliberate search may or may not yield more essays. The issue at hand is the indication that the substance of folklore and its scholarship is not impeded by any negative meaning the term folklore connotes in other contexts.
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Among historians the attitude to folklore and the folk is more problemat When they seek to use broad strokes to portray U.S. society in history, some sele a point of view that obscures folklore, others uphold its importance, and still oth skirt their way around it. For example, Michael Kammen, a 1973 Pulitzer Pr historian, constructs the U.S. search for cultural identity in terms of compet categories: national versus folk. Scholarship receives but a dismissing note in description:
Obviously, some interest in folklore and folk culture could be found in the United States prior to the interwar years. It emerged as an academic enthusiasm late in the 1880s, when not one but two professional associations were formed. Scholarly essays soon began to appear, journals were published, and even some state-based organizations such as the Virginia Folk-Lore Society founded in 1913. [Kammen 1991:426] He continues his description of the interest in folklore in the United States during the interwar years on the basis of publications in popular magazines and on the prestige government personalities accord the presentation of folklore. The interest of wealthy folk art collectors receives more attention than the interest of any scholars who researched folklore in that era and whose work is presented in a patchy and unsystematic way in the service of the historical picture Kammen wishes to present (1991:426-443 ).
The American Historical Review forum that appeared in 1992 represents a most serious approach to the issue of folklore in industrial society. Centered around Lawrence Levine (1992) , three other historians-Robin Kelley (1992) , Natalie Zemon Davis (1992) , and T. J. Jackson Lears (1992) -address the issues of conceptualizing "folk" and "folklore" in relation to mass media communication.
Their discussion shifts from a theoretical to an empirical examination of the issues, drawing upon interdisciplinary scholarship that includes folklore studies, without the slightest hesitation about the intellectual value of either term as an effective means for the conceptualization of ideas. If "folk" represents a marginal group in the lecture of one historian, another retorts that the conception of margin itself is a problematic issue. In their entire discussion there is no trace ofJane Beck's concern that the marginality of thefolk is contagious and affects folklore (1997:123).14 Another historian finds folklore inadequate for his own purposes and opts for William Graham Sumner's folkways instead. Seeking to construct the historical changes in U.S. culture, David Hackett Fischer (1989:7-11 ) finds folklore an inadequate concept. Curiously, in his reasoning he draws upon hesitations and doubts that are apparent in folklore scholarship. He points out that James Deetz, Henry Glassie, and Dell Upton prefer the use of the term vernacular rather thanfolk in reference to architecture (Fischer 1989:8) ; subsequently, he selects to modify the term folkways, ridding it of any biological connotations that Sumner (1906) imputed to it originally, and proceeds to use the term in a way that has a close semantic affinity with the current use offolklore.
Such terminological nuancing is part of any intellectual discourse. F of terms is necessary for the presentation of ideas. In the process some others modify the term folklore. No doubt some writers confound the t others see through its layered meaning. In the final analysis we cannot be for how others view us, only for what we do. Our actions give mean name. There are no unlucky stars or unlucky names for disciplines.
The moments of self-evaluation that punctuate the history of our could serve as constructive, critical self-examination; those may be theoretical and methodological turning points. But in these moment lose sight of the fundamentals of folklore and the intellectual tradi which we draw and to which we attempt to contribute. Contrary to popular and public culture, folklore is not a research of the eleventh urge to preserve and display the past fuels community action, not the ac the folklorist who records in order to analyze and interpret. By the trad tion of ideas, beliefs, and artistic forms and by the transformation of b customs, communities preserve, commemorate, and even construct th the course of research speakers do not identify their songs, proverbs, ta and buildings as traditional unless they are so conceived by their co Consequently the communal process of traditionalization and th search for tradition converge, giving the false impression that folklore discipline that perches on the eleventh hour-line. But this is a case of sion. Like other social and humanistic disciplines, folklore contemplat already been done and said, and, in most cases, has but a weak predic ity. Casting our observations into models, hypotheses and scenarios m istically valuable but are not essential. In that respect folklore joins a ho disciplines that are descriptive and interpretive rather than prescriptive tive.'1 The map of these disciplines may be changing, and if so, the inter torians, linguists, anthropologists, and literary theoreticians in our subje only strengthens the position of folklore. Folklorists, who know the ject more profoundly than students of other disciplines, could formulate questions that reflect their knowledge and at the same time relate their broader intellectual concerns. If the genres of scholarship are somew now, if their boundaries are crossed, and if their territories are new ated, it does not mean that they all turn into a muddled thought, lackin pline, language, and history that their names signify.
To end I would like to shift from folkloristics to folklore and conc parable from the Hasidic tradition:
Rabbi Zusya said, "In the coming world, they will not ask me: 'Why were you not will ask me: 'Why were you not Zusya?' " [Buber 1947:251] 2Following the war period, The Folk-Lore Society in England was headed demic presidents (Dorson 1961:17-19) . Later Dorson commented, "Folkl and once highly honored in England, now languishes, not for the lack of int want of academic recognition" (Dorson 1965:242) . 3Herskovits quotes van Gennep in French; the translation is mine.
4The antiquarian perspective, however, was central to affluent collectors w became a subject of scholarly research into the history of U.S. folk art collec Rumford 1980 and Vlach 1985 . I would like to thank Robert St. George f clarification of some of the issues related to this movement of interest in U.S. 5Bakhtin wrote his book on Rabelais as a doctoral dissertation that he subm stitute (Clark and Holquist 1984:263) .
6References to Vico (1984[19481) are made by citing the paragraph numbe 7See the note entitled "AFS Admitted to Constituency in American Cou '5There is a voluminous literature on the scientific nature of the social scien A starting point for reading on this subject is Nagel 1961:447-606. 16In the Hebrew version of his book (1957:481), Martin Buber notes that from Yehudah Yaari. Zusya of Annopol (d. 1800) was a Hasidic preacher, wh were edited in the book Menorat Zahav (1902) (see Rabinowicz 1996:563-56 
